Why are many of China's successful rural enterprises publically owned by local communities? Using a set of provincial data, we find that the share of community public firms (Township-Village Enterprises, or TVEs) relative to private enterprises is higher where the central government's influence is greater, the community government's power is stronger, and the level of market development is lower. We also find that TVEs help achieve the community government's goals of increasing government revenue, rural non-farm employment, and rural income. However, TVEs do not increase rural income given the levels of non-farm employment and/or local public goods provision, indicating possible inefficiency as compared to private enterprises.
PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF FIRMS: EVIDENCE FROM RURAL CHINA

I. Introduction
In studying economies in transition from plan to market, no single issue has received more attention from economists and policy makers than the one of property rights and ownership of firms. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, one observes mass privatization of old state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the emergence of new private (including newly privatized) enterprises. In China, old SOEs also declined even without privatization, and new private enterprises flourish. However, there is a puzzle concerning China's successful Township-Village Enterprises (TVEs).
TVEs are not private enterprises, nor SOEs. While SOEs are (central government-owned) national public firms, TVEs are rural (community government-owned) local public firms controlled by community (township or village) governments. Between 1979 and 1993, the TVE share of the national industrial output expanded from 9 percent to 27 percent, while the share of rural private enterprises increased from 0 to 9 percent (China Statistical Yearbook, 1994) . Combining TVEs with private enterprises in 1993, rural industries as a whole produced 36 percent of the national industrial output, and rural industries and services employed 123 million people, accounting for about one half of the national non-farm employment. Rural industries, and in particular TVEs, have made major contributions in sustaining China's 10 percent annual growth during its transition to markets.
Why are there many community publically owned TVEs? The conventional theory on the ownership of firms has largely focused on private and national public enterprises. Recently, several new theories have been proposed to explain TVEs. A large body of this literature has viewed TVEs as local (i.e., community) government ownership taking advantage of the existing institutional environment to achieve certain government goals.
Several possible objectives of community government are studied. In the context of rural China, the three most relevant goals of a community government are considered to be the community government's revenue (e.g., Byrd and Gelb [1990] , Oi [1992 Oi [ , 1994 , Che and Qian [1998b] ), non-farm employment (e.g., Rozelle and Boisvert [1994] ), and per capita income, which provide its financial and political support.
The only empirical work on the issue that we are aware of is that of Naughton [1996] , who, in univariate 1 regressions, finds a positive correlation between the share of TVEs in a province and its "urban proximity." We show later that his result will not hold in multivariate regressions.
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Theories suggest that community government ownership of TVEs can be a more effective instrument than private ownership in achieving the government's objectives when contracts are incomplete (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny [1994] and Che and Qian [1998b] ).
Theories also relate the ownership of firms to the specific institutional environment during the process of transition and development. Three institutional factors are emphasized which might give more political and economic advantages to TVEs rather than to private enterprises, given the goals of the community government: the central government's influence, the community government's power, and underdevelopment of the market. These factors can operate through several channels. Theories suggest that TVEs are favored in credit rationing by the central government or in the imperfect capital market (e.g., Wong [1988, 1991] , , Che and Qian [1998a] ), and TVEs may use their political connections with the central government-owned SOEs to smooth transactions when the product market is underdeveloped (e.g., Nee [1992] , Otsuka [1996] ). Another possibility is that TVEs are vehicles for the community government to cash in the value of land under its control in the absence of asset markets (Naughton [1994 (Naughton [ , 1996 ). Other theories propose that TVEs are better protected politically by the community government's power in the absence of secure property rights under the rule of law (e.g., Chang and Wang [1994] , Li [1996] , Che and Qian [1998b] ), and TVEs benefit from the community government which was empowered by the initial collective assets and experiences before the reform (e.g., Chang and Wang [1994] , Putterman [1994] , Luo [1990] ).
All of these theories seem plausible, but none of them has been investigated empirically. In this 1 paper, we use a set of provincial data to carry out an empirical analysis on TVEs vs. private ownership of firms. Inspired by the above theories but limited by the data available, we will focus on two empirical issues.
First, how do the three factors concerning the institutional environment of firms explain the observed provincial variation of ownership distribution between TVEs and private enterprises? And second, how effectively does community government ownership of TVEs, as opposed to private ownership, help the 3 community government to achieve the three objectives? We find that TVEs, relative to private enterprises, are favored in a province where the central government's influence is greater through a larger state supply of credit and more state industrial enterprises. TVEs are also favored where the community government's power is stronger through having more collective assets under its control at the beginning of the reform and stronger local political strength. On the other hand, private enterprises, relative to TVEs, are more likely to develop in the environment of less anti-market ideology and better market development through more product market expansion and urbanization. We also find some evidence on the effectiveness of TVE ownership in pursuing the community government's goals: The TVE share in the rural non-farm sector increases the community government's share of revenue, and somewhat surprisingly, the state's (all governments above the township level) share of revenue as well, but more so for the former. The TVE share also raises rural non-farm employment and rural real per capita income, but it does not increase income for the given levels of non-farm employment and/or local public goods provision.
These results help in understanding the nature of TVEs and private enterprises and provide several insights which may have implications beyond China. First, the distribution of firms between local public and private ownership reflects the institutional features in the process of transition from plan to markets and economic development, which can be summarized by three factors: the central government's influence, the local community government's power, and market development. Second, ownership of TVEs may serve as an effective instrument for both the community and central governments to raise more revenue and for the community government to retain a larger share. This provides some evidence on the incentives of all levels of government, especially the community government, to develop TVEs. Indeed, development of TVEs helps the government avoid revenue crises which are often observed in other transition and developing economies.
Third, although TVEs generate a higher level of rural non-farm employment and a higher revenue share for the community government than private enterprises, they do not increase per capita income for the given levels of non-farm employment and/or local public goods provision. Because of the relatively high capitallabor ratio in TVEs, this finding may indicate that TVEs are not as efficient as private enterprises.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief description of TVEs and their roles in China's economic reform. Section III summarizes theories on ownership of TVEs and their This is in accordance with the general East Asian model of rural-based development [Hayami 1996 ]. 2 4 major testable implications. Section IV discusses estimation methods. Section V describes the construction of regression variables. Section VI presents results on the provincial variation of the relative share of TVEs vs. private enterprises in rural industry. Section VII reports results of the effect of TVE ownership on the community government's objectives. Section VIII concludes.
II. TVEs and China's Economic Reforms
The Chinese economy is divided into "urban" and "rural" areas, which is an administrative rather than economic concept inherited from the planning era. Firms in the urban area consist of state-owned, collectively-owned, privately-owned, and "other" (including foreign) firms. State-owned enterprises are national public firms owned by the central government and supervised by the four upper levels of government: central, provincial, prefecture, and county (a municipality can have a rank of the latter three).
Firms in the rural area are called rural enterprises, which consist of two ownership types: community public firms (TVEs) and private firms. In China, the state sector refers to SOEs in urban areas and the non-state sector refers to the rest.
Between 1978 and 1993, the share of the state sector in the national industrial output declined from 78 percent to 43 percent, while the share of rural enterprises increased from 9 percent to 36 percent (the rest came from other urban enterprises such as collectives, private, and foreign firms) [China Statistical Yearbook, 1994] . These relative share changes have occurred without any privatization of old SOEs. In 1993, total rural enterprise employment reached 123 million, accounting for about one-half of the national non-farm employment. Clearly, rural enterprises have played an essential role in China's economic reform. 2 Within the rural enterprise sector, both TVEs and private enterprises flourish, but until recently, TVEs have played more important roles in rural industrialization than private enterprises. At the end of 1992, China had about 50 thousand townships and 800 thousand villages. On average, each township (with a population of about 18 thousand) had 8.2 township-run enterprises, and each village (with a population of However, TVEs and rural industrialization in China were not planned and actively supported by the central 3 government at the initial stage. This historical fact is reflected in the following quote from Deng Xiaoping on June 12, 1987: "The greatest achievement that was totally out of our expectation is that rural enterprises [both TVEs and private enterprises] have developed" [Economic Daily, June 13, 1993] .
In fact, in response to a central government austerity program, total TVE employment fell from 48.9 million in 1988 4 to 47.2 million in 1989, and further to 45.9 million in 1990. In contrast, employment in the state-sector increased during the same period [China Statistical Yearbook, 1992] . 5 about 1,000) had 1.4 village-run enterprises [China Statistical Yearbook, 1993] . In 1993, there were about 1.5 million TVEs with 52 million employees, and the shares of TVE output and employment in rural industry were 72 percent and 58 percent respectively, with the remaining shares coming from private enterprises [China Township Enterprises Statistical Yearbook, 1994] . The TVE subsector is indeed significant by both absolute and relative measures.
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TVEs are local community public firms owned and controlled by the township or village government (Chang and Wang [1994] ; and Che and Qian [1998a] ). TVEs are not private enterprises. As compared with private enterprises, TVEs receive substantial assistance from the community government (see section III below) and also suffer from problems typically found in public firms, such as weaker managerial incentives and greater political intervention from the community government [Zhang 1996 ].
On the other hand, the local community government-owned TVEs differ significantly from the central government-owned SOEs. Although both the theoretical and empirical parts of our paper are about TVEs and private enterprises and are not about the comparison between TVEs and SOEs, it is worthwhile to summarize the important differences between TVEs and SOEs as useful background.
Some empirical works have found that TVEs are much more efficient than SOEs in terms of productivity growth (e.g., Jefferson and Rawski [1994] ). At the enterprise level, TVEs differ from SOEs in the following three aspects. First, TVEs have not been under state allocation plans for either input or output.
In the early periods, the central government tolerated TVEs for the purpose of agricultural mechanization; indeed, many TVEs started as agricultural machine repairing shops. Later, TVEs expanded their scope of operation to pursue local industrialization. Second, TVE workers are not state employees who receive job security and welfare from the state. Unlike SOE employees, TVE workers can be laid off. Third, although 4 TVEs have softer budget constraints than private enterprises, they have much harder budget constraints than During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the total size of SOE industrial output was about twice that of TVEs.
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However, for each year between 1986 and 1992, loans to all rural enterprises accounted for only about 8 percent of all non-agricultural loans, while loans to SOEs accounted for about 86 percent. During the retrenchment period in the late 1980s, the share of new loans to rural enterprises in total non-agricultural areas declined from 10.2 percent in 1988 to 6.8 percent in 1989, and the share of new loans to SOEs increased from 82.9 percent in 1988 to 90.5 percent in 1989 [Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, 1993] .
Before 1994, the leaders of village (township) governments were appointed by township (county) governments. 6 Evidence suggests that community economic performance, especially TVE performance, is an important criteria used for appointments [Whiting 1995] . After 1994, the leaders of village governments have been directly elected by village residents and those of township government are still appointed by county governments. Byrd and Gelb [1990] report a high correlation between county (one level above township) revenues and 7 expenditures within a province in the 1980s, which leads to what they called "ineffective redistribution" across counties and townships in the rural area. Wong [1997] also reports that in the 1990s the rural sector is still very much neglected by the fiscal system. Counties face hard fiscal budget constraints, and, on average, they have inadequate revenues to finance their expenditure responsibilities.
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SOEs. TVEs have been receiving proportionally many fewer loans than SOEs and they were hit badly during the retrenchment period.
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A more thorough understanding of the difference between TVEs and SOEs requires a deeper knowledge about township and village governments. Under China's highly decentralized fiscal system, fiscal 6 "self-sufficiency" has been a basic principle for the rural community governments [Wong 1997 ]. These community governments retain and use a large proportion of the revenues they generate on the one hand, and they receive no or very few fiscal budgetary transfers from higher level governments on the other. At the 7 same time, the authority of township and village governments in some important aspects is more constrained as compared to the central government and even to higher level local governments such as provincial governments. For example, although township and village governments may have connections with SOEs and exert some influence on the state financial institutions, they do not control them. Moreover, township and village governments are unable to erect trade barriers since their jurisdictions are geographically too small. Therefore, as compared to the central and higher level local governments, township and village governments have more constrained authority and have relatively hard budget constraints from the fiscal and financial channels. These are possibly fundamental reasons for TVEs to perform better than SOEs, although both are government-owned (Qian and Weingast [1996] ; and Che and Qian [1998a] ).
In an alternative approach, Weitzman and Xu [1994] point to the Chinese culture for the success of TVEs which 8 they view as vaguely defined cooperatives. We leave this theory out because we are unable to measure variations of the Chinese culture across provinces inside China.
Consider other possible objectives of government. Maximization of the budget is not quite relevant given the fixed 9 and limited fiscal transfers from higher level government; maximization of votes is irrelevant because the leaders of townships and villages were not elected before 1994; lobbying for central government projects is not very realistic because the central government usually does not have projects located in rural areas; and promotion to counties does not look very attractive compared to running a profitable enterprise, given the low salary for civil servants and limited power of those offices (on the last point, see Byrd and Gelb [1990] ). Because the community government plays a central role in TVEs, theories about them start with the goals of the community government in developing TVEs. In the late 1970s, rural China was characterized by a large amount of surplus labor, a low level of income, and a poor local government revenue base. Economic reform has since proceeded in the direction of fiscal decentralization, under which township and village governments were able to retain a large portion of their revenues while obtaining few revenue transfers from the higher level. Consequently, the most relevant objectives of a community government are considered to be an increase of the government's revenue, creation of non-farm employment, and an increase of rural income.
Conceivably, the first provides financial support and the latter two provide political support for the community government.
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All of the aforementioned objectives of the community government can be achieved by rural industrialization. However, it is not obvious whether community government-owned firms (TVEs) or private firms are more effective in achieving the government's goals. An important consideration is the incompleteness of contracts, which entails the relevance of allocation of ownership of firms in general and government ownership of firms in particular (Shleifer and Vishny [1994] , and Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny [1997] , Che and Qian [1998b] ). Theories on TVEs relate the ownership of firms to the specific institutional environment in which the firms are operating. During the process of transition and development, both government and market institutions are problematic. Three factors concerning the institutional environment of firms which might give more political and economic advantages to TVEs rather than to private enterprises are: the central government's influence, the community government's power, and under-development of the market.
In what follows, we first discuss several channels through which the three institutional factors may play important roles in the development of rural industrial firms. They are financing of investments, transaction costs, urbanization, security of property rights, and collective heritage. We then discuss the three objectives of the community government for developing TVEs.
Ownership and the Institutional Environment
The first theory proposes that TVEs have distinct advantages in financing investment compared to private enterprises because of the central government's influence and/or under-development of the capital market. The start-up capital for private enterprises comes mainly from owners with little coming from bank loans. Given the limited amount of personal financial resources, private enterprises have difficulty growing. In contrast, TVEs are able to access a larger pool of capital, in particular, bank loans, with the help of the community government [Wong 1988 [Wong , 1991 .
TVEs may have an advantage over private enterprises in financing investment because the community government can make use of its political connections with the central government-owned state banks to channel loans to TVEs. The state banks are also more willing to lend to TVEs because ideological discrimination against private enterprises makes lending to the latter politically more risky. TVEs may also have possible advantages in financing investment due to the under-development of market financial institutions and the imperfect capital market ; Che and Qian [1998a] ). For example, the community government is able to share risks by cross-subsidization among its many diversified enterprises, thus reducing the default risks borne by banks. The community government can also reduce agency costs in 9 borrowing because of its larger endowment in physical and financial assets. From both perspectives, this theory implies that the relative share of TVEs is positively correlated with the supply of credit from state financial institutions to all rural enterprises, but negatively correlated with the extent of financial market development.
Second, the "transaction costs" theory similarly relates TVEs to the partial liberalization of the economy with the co-existence of the central government's influence and under-development of the market.
Nee [1992] contends that China's economy is characterized by declining but still functioning central government planning institutions on the one hand, and emerging but weak market institutions with poorly specified and enforced property rights on the other. TVEs, with help from the community government, have a lower transaction cost in dealing with the existing SOEs, which enable them to access the SOEs' technology and materials. Quite often, TVEs and SOEs establish a long term relationship through subcontracting [Otsuka 1996 ]. On the other hand, private enterprises have lower transaction costs in dealing with other enterprises in competitive markets, because, for example, private entrepreneurs have higher marketing ability.
This theory suggests a positive relationship between the share of TVEs and the importance of links with the state industrial sector, and a negative relationship between the TVE share and product market development.
Third, Naughton [1994, 1996] views developing TVEs as vehicles for the community government to convert community assets (i.e., land) to cash flow under the situation in which the development of asset markets lags behind that of product markets. He implicitly assumes an imperfection of the land rental market so that the only way of transforming land value into income streams is to directly operate businesses on it.
He argues that because land close to urban areas is more valuable, communities closer to them have more incentives to transform assets into income streams by developing TVEs. However, one may also argue that a higher degree of urbanization can be associated with better market development, and thus reduce the disadvantages of small private enterprises in doing business through more accessible outlets for output, increased support for specialized inputs, labor market pooling, and technological spillovers. Naughton's testable hypothesis is the positive correlation between the share of TVEs in a community and its "urban proximity," which is a measure of the proximity of the community to urban centers weighted by urban population.
This would imply that it is possible that local political strength can also benefit the central government.
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The fourth theory concerns the security of property rights of firms and associates the advantages of TVEs over private enterprises with the local community government's power for political protection. China's reform has proceeded in an environment which lacks a rule of law. As part of the political institutions, the community government can provide better political security to their own enterprises (Chang and Wang [1994] ). The community government's protection of TVEs becomes more effective than that of private enterprises because ownership gives the community government better information about the operation of firms (Li [1996] ). Che and Qian [1998b] endogenize the community government's role in securing TVE property rights under a predatory state. Under TVE ownership, the community government integrates government activities (i.e., community public goods provision) and business activities, and it can better serve the interests of the central government. Consequently, the central government is less predatory toward community governmentowned firms (TVEs) than private firms, and property rights under TVEs become more secure. In such a case, both the central government and the community government can benefit from TVE ownership. This theory 10 implies that the share of TVEs vs. private enterprises is positively correlated with the local political strength of the community government against pressure from the central government, but negatively correlated with the change of nationwide ideology in favor of the market economy.
The fifth theory relates TVEs to the history of China's economic planning and development. Because of 20 years spent implementing the commune system, the community government in rural China had already accumulated an unusual amount of physical and human capital by the late 1970s. One might argue that this particular historical experience empowered the community government, and thus gave TVEs organizational advantages over private enterprises (Chang and Wang [1994] and Putterman [1994] ). However, one might also argue that this legacy provided more incentives for the community government to suppress private enterprises instead, in order to, for example, reduce competition in the skilled labor market [Luo 1990 ]. In either case, the "history matters" theory implies that the relative share of TVEs in the late 1980s and early 1990s should positively correlate with the strength of the rural collective sector at the beginning of reform, 11 which is the community government's initial power base.
Ownership and the Community Government's Objectives
First, several studies have emphasized the revenue goals of the community government in developing TVEs. Both Byrd and Gelb [1990] and Oi [1992 Oi [ , 1994 stress the effect of fiscal decentralization that has made community governments independent fiscal entities. Community governments are able to retain and use a large proportion of the revenues they generate, and they are also subject to hard fiscal budget constraints due to limited fiscal revenue transfers from the higher level government. These authors then argue that, under this circumstance, community governments turn to TVEs for a revenue source.
However, these authors did not explain why the revenue objectives of the community government can be better achieved by developing TVEs. Conceivably, in a developed market economy, government ownership of firms may not help increase government revenue, and even worse, the inefficiency associated with public ownership is likely to decrease both profits and government revenue as compared with private ownership. One plausible explanation for the positive linkage between TVE ownership and community government revenue is based on incomplete contracts (Che and Qian [1998b] ). Due to inadequate accounting and taxation institutions, the community government finds it hard to tax private firms. However, the community government can better extract revenue from TVEs because ownership gives it control over, and information about, operation of the firms. In the model of Che and Qian [1998b] , because the community government also carries out revenue-enhancing local government activities by providing local public goods, both the community government and the central government can benefit from TVEs in terms of their own revenues. This theory implies that we may not only expect a positive correlation between the TVE shares and the revenue share of the community government, but also a positive correlation between the TVE shares and the revenue share of the central government.
Second, creation of non-farm employment in a community ranks very high on the list of community leader's concerns [Rozelle and Boisvert 1994] , and is often a motive claimed by the community government itself for developing TVEs. Reduction of rural underemployment is especially important in China because of some restrictions on and/or costs of labor migration from the rural to urban areas. Although an increase of non-farm employment is generally efficiency enhancing in rural China, there may also be the possibility of inefficient excess employment. Whether developing TVEs is more effective than developing private enterprises to increase non-farm employment depends on the net effect of several factors. On the one hand, because TVEs are able to mobilize more capital than private enterprises, they may bring in more capital investment which leads to more non-farm employment. In addition, the ownership rights give the community government the power to force TVEs to employ workers at the high level it desires. On the other hand, private enterprises typically have much lower capital-labor ratios [Zhang and Ronnas 1996] , and thus they may provide more employment opportunities for a given level of capital investment.
The third often claimed objective of the community government in developing TVEs is raising per capita income within the community. Because of the restrictions on and/or costs of labor migration, one way TVEs could contribute to raising per capita income is through increased local employment opportunities.
Another way TVEs could contribute to raising per capita income is through an increased local public goods provision due to the improvement of the community government's revenue, because local public goods are usually under-supplied in the rural areas. On the other hand, inefficiency associated with the community government's political intervention may reduce per capita income. Therefore, developing TVEs could also be less effective than developing private enterprises to increase rural income.
IV. Estimation Method
The above theories inspired us to address the following two empirical questions. First, suppose that the community government's objectives are the same across provinces. Then, how do the three factors concerning the institutional environment of firms explain the observed provincial variation of ownership distribution between TVEs and private enterprises? Second, how effectively do TVEs, as opposed to private enterprises, help the community government achieve the objectives of increasing government revenue, nonfarm employment, and per capita income?
Data of many variables before 1986 is not available. Data after 1994 is not available at the time of this writing.
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Even if it exists, it may present some problems because since 1994 a new category of ownership emerged known as "joint stock cooperatives," in addition to TVEs and private enterprises, but no unified national rule has yet been established to distinguish this form from TVEs and private firms.
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We use provincial data from 1986 to 1993. There are 28 provinces, excluding Tibet and Hainan.
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We incorporate Hainan into Guangdong in our data because Hainan separated from Guangdong and obtained a provincial status only in 1988. An advantage of such comprehensive data, as compared with survey data from a few provinces, is that it covers the entire country which has great variations across provinces.
We use the following econometric model to examine the provincial variation of ownership distribution. Let p be the probability of observing a worker (or unit of output) being employed (or produced) it by TVEs, rather than private enterprises, in province i in year t, and X represent various aspects of the it factors concerning the institutional environment of firms. We assume that p is a logit function of X :
where " 's represent provincial fixed effects, ( 's yearly fixed effects, and u 's are error terms. This
formulation has the property that the "odds ratio" has a log-linear functional form
Equation (1) may also be a provincial specific error component and the variances of u 's may vary across provinces. To it address these problems, we compute Huber-White robust standard errors allowing for group errors by provinces using the procedure suggested by Deaton [1995] . We report ordinary least squares estimation results with t-ratios based on Huber-White robust standard errors.
As will be described below, several of our variables (for example, initial collective assets) are not time varying, and thus they would be absorbed into provincial fixed effects " 's in the estimations including i all provincial dummies. Therefore, instead of using all provincial dummies, we use 6 region dummies in our regressions to capture some pre-existing regional differences. We group the 28 provinces into 6 regions according to geographic location: North, South, Southwest, Northwest, Coastal, and huge cities (for details
In addition, we have also run all corresponding regressions for single years and for the averages over 1986-1993. 12 The results are similar and are reported in the earlier version of the paper. 14 see next section). We also report estimation results from regressions without these region dummies.
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To investigate the effectiveness of TVE ownership in achieving the alternative government's objectives, we estimate the structural equations with causality going from the share of TVEs to government revenues, non-farm employment, and per capita income. The general form of the equations we use is given by:
where y represents the dependent variables we are interested in, i. example, per capita cultivated land and urbanization; and v is an error term. We again use 6 region dummies it to capture some pre-existing regional differences.
The error term v in equation (2) shares. This arises from the possibility that, while the ownership distribution may indeed have an effect on the government's revenues, employment and income, there may be another structural equation, say p = g(y ,
it it X , Z ), where the causality runs from the latter to the TVE shares. For example, community governments it it with a higher share of revenues may have a larger capability to finance their enterprises, which in turn leads to a higher share of TVE ownership. Thus, both Y and p should be treated as endogenous variables in it it equation (2) . To correct for the endogeneity problem, we use an instrumental variable method to estimate equation (2) . The set of instrumental variables includes X from equation (1) and Z from equation (2), as it it well as all region and year dummies. In addition, we also report the results from the ordinary-least-squared estimations. For both ordinary-least-squared and instrumental variable estimations, we report t-ratios based on Huber-White robust standard errors allowing for provincial group effects.
In our specification, some variables in X which have direct effects on TVE shares are not present in it equations (2) . This differentiates them from the equations with reverse causality running from the government revenue to the TVE shares and thus makes them identifiable. In fact, these equations are Appendix Dabaogan form is based on fixed renting, and community governments are not involved at all in any production decision-making and revenue sharing arrangements with households.
The Dabaogan form initially started spontaneously in the late 1970s in a few provinces, and it was soon welcomed enthusiastically by households across the country. The central government endorsed the Dabaogan form as early as 1980. For three consecutive years starting in 1982, the Party Central Committee issued three No.1 Party Circulars to put pressure on community governments across the country to adopt this form, and by the end of 1984, nearly 100 percent of households had done so. Communities which had not adopted it by the end of 1983 demonstrated the community governments' political strength to resist pressure from both above and below. We interpret this resistance as coming from community governments rather than higher levels of local governments because the adoption of this form was not uniform at the county and provincial levels.
We have three variables to measure market development. The first is private financial assets at the end of the previous year to indicate financial market development. Because the data for total private 15 financial assets is not available, the total rural household savings deposits are used instead, which is a
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Two other more readily available sets of data are from the China Statistical Yearbook, one a non-agricultural 17 population and the other a population of designated cities and towns. But neither of them is appropriate: the former is downward biased, and the latter is upward biased.
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reasonably good proxy if the amount of household savings deposits is roughly proportional to the amount of total household financial assets. We normalize private household savings deposits in a province by its rural gross output. This measure is parallel to the usual measure for "financial deepening," which is the ratio of total financial assets in the economy to total GDP. Therefore, our index of private financial assets is not an index of the level of private wealth, but the level of the development of rural financial markets.
The second variable is product market development. We use the total transaction volume in rural free markets in a province divided by its total rural gross output to measure the development of the product market. The transaction volume in the rural free market indicates overall private trading activities in the markets of farm products and consumer goods, as well as producer goods. A higher index means a better opportunity for enterprises to obtain a supply of materials from, and to sell their outputs to, the market.
Because the local industrial enterprises only account for a very small proportion of the total transactions in these markets, this index can be thought of as exogenous.
Finally, urbanization is also potentially associated with the extent of market development. We use the index of urbanization measured by the share of urban population in the total population. We use the 1990 census data because it is the most appropriate for our purposes. A related, but different, index for 17 urbanization is the urban proximity index constructed by Naughton [1996] , which is a weighted average of the inverse of distance from the center of a province to selected major cities, using the city population as weight. The two indices give very similar results so we will only use urban population in our reports.
In addition, we use year dummies for each year between 1987 and 1993 to capture any changes over one particular year as compared with the previous year. Because macroeconomic policy changes over years We use 6 region dummies to capture pre-existing regional differences among 28 provinces. We divide China into North and South (according to climate and patten of agricultural activities) and East and West (the West is mountainous and the East is relatively flat) to obtain four regions: North and South in the East, and Southwest and Northwest in the West. We then separately list 6 coastal provinces as one region because they were one step ahead in reforms and opening up to foreign trade and investment. Finally, we single out the three huge cities of Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai because they are small in geographical size and do not have large rural areas like all the other provinces.
In examining the community government's objectives, consider first the government's revenue. The net income of the rural economy is generated from three sources. The first two sources are the income generated by farm households and private enterprises respectively. Part of this income is paid to the state (all governments above the township and village level) as taxes, part goes to community governments under the names of "collective reserves" and "administrative fees," and the remaining part is retained by households.
The third source is the income generated by TVEs. Part of this income is submitted to the state as taxes and fees, but a major part goes to households as wages and bonuses, and the remainder (including retained profits) is controlled by community governments. From the destination perspective, the net income of the rural economy is distributed among three entities: the state (all governments above the township and village level), the community (township and village) government, and households. The state's revenue includes all state taxes and fees remitted to the government above the township. The community government revenue is the income received by township and village governments, including retained profits from TVEs. The remaining income belongs to households.
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In addition to the community government's and the state's shares of revenue, our dependent variables also include rural non-farm employment and the rural income level. We use share of the rural non-
We also estimated the linear probability model and the results (available upon request) are similar.
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19 agricultural labor force in the total rural labor force to measure the level of rural non-farm employment. We measure the income level by the rural real per capita income at the 1980 price.
We use the share of TVEs in rural enterprise employment in both industry and services as our independent variable to measure the importance of TVE ownership relative to private ownership. This is because our dependent variables concerning income and employment also include the sources from both industry and services.
The summary statistics of the above variables are reported in Table I . Our data set has a much smaller sample variation over time than across provinces. This is not surprising because most variables are characterizations of the institutional environment which shift slowly over time at the provincial aggregate level and our data covers only 8 years. Three variables, local political strength, the share of urban population, and initial collective assets, are not time varying. Among the rest, the variances over time of the share of TVE industrial employment and output account for about 2 percent and 8 percent of total variances respectively, and those of the revenue shares of the community government and the state represent about 8 percent and 12 percent of the total variances respectively. Only the variances over time of the state supply of credit and private assets are significant, accounting for about 42 percent and 34 percent of the total variances respectively.
[place Table I here] VI. Estimation Results: Provincial Variation of Ownership Table II reports the regression results for the provincial variation of ownership distribution between TVEs and private enterprises. We initially included in our regressions the variables of adult education (measured by the percentage of the rural labor force having at least primary schooling) and the per capita cultivated land. They are not significant and we later dropped them. First, the coefficients for the supply of credits from state financial institutions are positive and significant, while the coefficients for private financial assets are not significant. This gives some support to the financial theory of TVE ownership. A large supply of state non-agricultural loans can increase the relative share of TVEs because, with the help of the community government, these loans are more likely to go to TVEs to support their development. However, the more important private financial assets in the rural economy, which indicates more developed informal financial markets, seems to affect both TVEs and private enterprises equally.
Second, the coefficients of product market development are all negative and significant, which suggests that product market development favors private enterprises. On the other hand, the effect of the size of state industry on TVEs is positive and significant. Therefore, a larger state industrial sector seems to favor TVEs, for example, through subcontracting. These results seem to be consistent with the transaction cost theory of TVEs.
Third, we were able to reproduce Naughton's [1996] result of a positive correlation between the share of TVEs in a province and its "urban proximity" (or our urbanization index) in univariate regressions for our extended sample period. Casual observation often gives the impression that TVEs are predominant in provinces with a high degree of urbanization or proximity to major cities, which is indeed captured by the univariate regressions.
However, the positive correlation no longer holds when other variables are being controlled. By adding the size of state industry, the coefficient of urbanization becomes insignificant in the output equation, suggesting that urbanization picked up some effects from the size of state industry in univariate regressions.
By further adding any one of the four variables --initial collective assets, local political strength, state supply of credit, and product market development --the coefficient of urbanization becomes negative in the output equation and insignificant in the employment equation. With all explanatory variables included, we find that the coefficient of urbanization (and that of Naughton's urban proximity index as well, which is not reported here) becomes negative and significant. This provides some evidence showing that urbanization favors private enterprises through better market development. For example, private enterprises can take advantage of being located near urban areas for a more accessible outlet for output, increased support for specialized inputs, labor market pooling, and technological spillovers.
Fourth, the local political strength seems to play an important role in favoring TVEs, as indicated by its positive and significant coefficients. A greater capability of community leaders to resist pressures from higher levels of government provides more effective political protection for TVEs relative to private enterprises, and therefore favors their development. As will be shown in the next section, a higher share of TVEs gives the community government more revenue; therefore, the community government has the incentive to provide more protection to TVEs than to private enterprises. The evidence seems to support the theory of the security of property rights.
Examining the year dummies we find a general trend of decline of TVEs relative to private enterprises in this time period. The evidence also indicates that the political retrenchment in 1989 stopped this decline temporarily, but it did not reverse this trend. On the other hand, there is some evidence of an acceleration of private enterprises relative to TVEs after 1992. It seems that a nationwide ideology shift toward conservatism does not effectively reduce the share of private enterprises in the rural economy immediately, but an ideology shift in a liberal direction leads to significant prosperity for private enterprises.
Perhaps the mere removal of existing restrictions on private enterprises induces an instant response, but adding new restrictions has little immediate effect as it takes time to establish effective enforcement.
Finally, the initial collective assets have a positive and significant effect on the TVE's shares in later years. According to one interpretation, those provinces with a larger base of accumulated physical and human capital controlled by the community government prior to the reform tend to give organizational advantages to TVEs relative to private enterprises. According to the alternative interpretation, a larger collective base provides community governments with higher incentives to suppress private enterprises. Both interpretations are consistent with the view that the community government's initial power base is crucial in the development of TVEs. They seem to accord well with the "history matters" theory of TVEs and
The "history matters" theory is supported by additional evidence. Simply examining the data over the 8 year period 20 reveals that TVEs grew faster than private enterprises in the provinces where they were initially strong, but more slowly in the provinces where they were initially weak.
It is also possible that local political strength is enhanced by TVEs. But our variable of "local political strength" 21 poses less of a problem because it is from 1983 and the dependent variables are after 1986.
This might be the case if the state banks had preferred to lend to TVEs and, if there are few TVEs, diverted the 22 loans for other purposes rather than lending to private enterprises. However, because most other loans in rural areas are agricultural loans, which are known to be less attractive to banks than loans to rural industry (including private enterprises), this consideration is less likely to be important.
Private assets would also be lower with more TVEs if TVEs had raised a large part their capital directly from 23 households because household bank deposits would be correspondingly reduced. In the period we consider here, however, this kind of direct financing is not significant [Zhang and Ronnas 1996] .
22
demonstrate the "path dependent" nature of institutional changes in agreement with North [1991] .
20
In the above regressions, there may be a potential endogeneity problem concerning the variables of "state supply of credit" and "private financial assets." The state supply of credit may rise when TVEs 21 demand more credit, and similarly, private assets would be higher with more private firms. We dealt with 22 23 this problem in two ways. First, we ran regressions by excluding these two variables and the results are reported in Table II . The results show that our estimations of other coefficients are not sensitive to the inclusion of these two variables. Second, we also looked at the "average TVE share" over our sample period as a function of "ex ante" provincial characteristics from the period before our sample. We first used only initial collective assets (1980), local political strength (1983) , and the 1982 share of urban population as ex ante characteristics, and later added the 1986 data of state supply of credit, private financial assets, product market development and the size of state industry as additional ex ante characteristics. We report the results, which are quite similar to our previous findings, in Table III . This again shows that our results are not driven by the potential endogeneity problem.
[place Table III What can be said about the magnitudes of the estimates? By looking at the effect of a 1 percent increase in the independent variables at the mean on the change of the TVE share, we find that the most significant variables in the employment equation are initial collective assets (0.17 percent), urbanization (0.15 percent), and product market development (0.15 percent). In the output equation, the most significant variables are urbanization (0.23 percent), product market development (0.14 percent), and initial collective assets (0.11 percent). In other words, the most significant variables concern the local government's power and market development.
We also looked at how much actual inter-provincial differences can be explained by the alternative independent variables in order to make some assessment of their economic importance. Take the pair of Shanghai (with the highest share of TVEs) and Guizhou (with the lowest share of TVEs) as an example. All the variables together (excluding region and year dummies) explain about 86 percent of the difference in the TVE share in employment and 89 percent in output. The two most important variables are the initial collective assets and product market development for employment (together they explain 69 percent of the difference), and the initial collective assets and the size of state industry for output (together they explain 65 percent of the difference). We also take a less extreme pair, Jiangsu (a coastal province) and Sichuan (an inland province), both having state industrial sectors of a moderate size. In this case, all the variables together (excluding region and year dummies) explain 73 percent of the difference in the TVE share in employment and 58 percent in output. The two most important variables are the initial collective assets and the product market development for both employment and output; together they explain 62 percent of the difference for employment and 44 percent of the difference for output. Again, the local government's power and market development seem to be the most important factors.
In comparison, Oi [1994] reports from her field work that the county government sometimes complained that their The state's share of revenue is positively related to real per capita income, which seems to be consistent with similar trends in other countries. For a given level of real per capita income, the TVE share in rural enterprise employment has positive effects on both the community government's and the state's shares of revenue, and more so for the community government. This seems to suggest that ownership of TVEs is an effective instrument for both the community government and the state to raise more revenue, and for the community government to obtain a larger share.
[place Table IV here] These results provide some evidence on the fiscal incentives of the community government in developing TVEs, which tends to confirm numerous previous findings from anecdote stories and case studies (e.g., Byrd and Gelb [1990] and Oi [1992 Oi [ , 1994 ). However, somewhat surprisingly, our results indicate that the state also benefits from TVEs in terms of its own revenue. This result provides some evidence on the 24 fiscal incentives of the central government for having more TVEs developed. Together, these findings give some support to the theory of the revenue goals of both the community government and the central government in developing TVEs (Che and Qian [1998b] ).
The revenue effect of TVEs may have some implications for transition and developing economies.
All transition economies have been experiencing government revenue shortfalls due to the collapse of the planning-based mechanism of revenue extraction. At the same time, all levels of government often find it difficult to tax new private firms due to the lack of market-based taxation institutions [McKinnon 1991 ]. On
The results on the household revenue share equation can be derived from the state's and community government's 25 revenue equation because the three revenue shares add up to one.
25 the other hand, the governments in developing economies, for political reasons, often bias the revenue allocation toward urban areas which hinders rural development [Bates 1987] . The above results provide some empirical evidence that TVEs helped reduce the severity of these two problems.
Interestingly, local political strength has a negative effect on the state's share of revenue and positive effects on the revenue shares of the community government and households, given the TVE's share in rural enterprise employment. These results may suggest a conflict of interest between the community government 25 and the central government (but not between the community government and households). For the given level of a TVE share, the political strength of community leaders plays an important role in increasing the combined community income at the expense of state taxes. This result shows that our variable of local political strength captures the ability of local resistance to pressure from above rather than below.
But stronger local political power also has an indirect positive effect on the state's revenue through the increased TVE's share, as is shown in section VI. Therefore the total effect of local political strength on the state's share of revenue is not necessarily negative. We have run alternative regressions in which the state's share and the community government's share of revenue are regressed on all exogenous variables X in it equation (1), and found that the total effect of local political strength on the state's and community government's shares of revenue is respectively positive and significant. This suggests that both the central government and the community government benefit from local political strength. This looks paradoxical, but it is consistent with the predictions of models considering commitment problems (e.g., Aghion and Tirole [1997] , Che and Qian [1998b] ). In such a situation, one party may gain by giving away some information or power to another party. Thus, we can view the local political power of community governments as a device to secure their revenues against the central government's arbitrary extraction and at the same time also make the central government better off through, say, improved incentives of the community government. remains positive and significant while that of the community government's share of revenue becomes insignificant; and the effect of TVE ownership on non-farm employment remains positive and significant while that on income is insignificant. These results (available on request) are consistent with the above findings.
26 the instruments are legitimate and can be excluded from the employment and income equations cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level. The following discussions are based on instrumental variable estimations.
The TVE's share in rural enterprise employment has a positive effect on the share of rural non-farm employment in the total rural labor force even with the control of per capita community government revenue (a proxy for local public goods provision). This provides some evidence that TVEs are able to create more non-farm employment opportunities than private enterprises. Thus, although private enterprises generally have a lower capital-labor ratio than TVEs, perhaps a lack of access to capital may be sufficiently severe to hinder their ability to increase non-farm employment. Although our result seems to support the theory that TVEs help increase non-farm employment, it does not necessarily mean that TVEs are more efficient in creating non-farm employment than private enterprises, given that capital is scarce and labor abundant in rural China.
[place Table V here] We also find that the TVE's share in rural enterprise employment has a positive and significant effect on per capita income when not conditioned on the non-farm employment of the rural labor force and local public goods provision. But for a given share of non-farm employment in the rural labor force and the level of local public goods provision, that effect becomes negative. These results seem to indicate that the effect of TVEs on increasing per capita income works only through expansions of non-farm employment and local public goods provision. Furthermore, taking into account the fact that TVEs have a higher capital-labor ratio than private enterprises, these results seem to indicate that TVEs are not as efficient as private enterprises.
In summary, we find some evidence on the effectiveness of TVE ownership in pursuing the community government's goals: TVEs seem to increase the revenue shares of the community government and the state, as well as to increase rural non-farm employment and income, but they do not increase income given the levels of non-farm employment and local public goods provision. 
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